PREDICTING, UP AND DOWN:
A FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL PREDICTION
Joseph Avery*
ABSTRACT
Legal prediction has long been a feature of lawyers’ and judges’ decision making, not least in diversity cases and
stay cases, and it has long formed a foundation for thinking about fundamental legal philosophical questions.
Recall H.L.A. Hart, Roscoe Pound, and others debating Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s pronouncement
that “[p]rophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”
With advances in computer science, new methods for making theories of prediction into reality are being
implemented; thus, in addition to retaining its centrality in legal philosophical debates, legal prediction is waxing
in practical significance. This Article provides the results of an empirical survey (nearly 200 currently sitting
U.S. judges) of judicial thought on legal prediction, and it uses these results, along with an analysis of legal
prediction cases in U.S. law, to argue that current legal scholarship has missed an important distinction in legal
prediction problems that should be pulled apart: predicting up (What will the agent of a subsequent legal decision
do? That is, what will the prosecutor decide? How will the court rule?) and predicting down (What will the
object of the legal decision do? That is, will the defendant show up for court? Will he recidivate?). An example
of a court predicting up is Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, where a lower court
anticipated a shift in higher court thinking. An example of a court predicting down is Miller v. Alabama, where
the Supreme Court limited life without parole sentences to only those juveniles who are considered “irreparably
corrupt.” There are unique issues that inhere to these distinct classes of prediction problems, such as technologicallegal lock-in, the need for lay connection to legal processes, and the risk of racial bias.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a deep debate that courses through legal scholarship, reflected
in its various forms in arguments surrounding transcendentalism and
functionalism,1 positivism and realism,2 the role of judges,3 and whether law
has some constraining force4 or is lost to nihilism.5 Surprisingly, amidst this
debate from which we may have emerged as post-Realists,6 there exists a
parallel debate regarding the importance of legal prediction, a topic that has
been controversial since it was brought to prominence by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr.7 As entrée into the debate, let us consider an example.
*
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Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278 (2001).
Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 655 (1995).
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141–42 (1961) (judges “are parts of a system the rules of
which are determinate enough at the centre to supply standards of correct judicial decision”).
Dorf, supra note 3, at 659 n.27.
Id. at 652.
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173 (1920). For
controversy and arguments surrounding the topic, see Dorf, supra note 3, at 652.
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When a startup owner is faced with a legal question, does she, in seeking
advice, merely want to predict the outcome of subsequent legal review of the
behavior? Or is she concerned with a less practical matter: whether she has,
in absolute or theoretical terms, violated applicable law? In addition, she
might wonder if there is any space between potential answers to these two
questions.
This debate impinges upon legal pragmatism, embodied perhaps best in
the personage of Roscoe Pound, but also embodied by Justice Holmes,
whether or not he personally embraced the term “pragmatism”:
“[P]rophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”8 This definition of the law has
become known as the “prediction model.”9
Staying with the above example regarding the startup owner, the idea is
that, rather than wonder whether she has violated the statute in question (the
answer to such a query might require review of the text of the statute, its
legislative history, judicial decisions surrounding it, and so on), she might
merely be wondering whether she is subject to censure. In other words, there
is no metaphysical question about the law and infractions of it; there is only
her utterly practical question: “Will my company be found guilty of violating
the law?” This question, of course, involves prediction. What does one
predict the legal decision maker (most likely a judge) will decide?
H. L. A. Hart vigorously pushed against Justice Holmes’s proposed
conception of the law, arguing that final authority does not create law by
virtue of its authority; the law exists independently of the authority figure.10
Because this point is so important, it is worth rehashing the analogy that
Professor Hart made. He described an athletic competition in which the
players initially enforced the rules themselves.11 We might imagine a game
of pickup basketball. Then, he had us imagine that a referee was introduced.
Now, with the referee installed, would it be correct to reduce the rules to
whatever the referee says they are? Surely not, argued Professor Hart. Just
as the players once applied the rules, the referee now applies them. At one
extreme, a nihilist might claim that the rules do not constrain the referee in
any way; at the other extreme, one might claim that the rules, when
8
9
10
11

Holmes, supra note 7, at 173.
Dorf, supra note 3, at 653.
Hart, supra note 4, at 138–44.
Hart, supra note 4, at 138–42.
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sufficiently clear, completely constrain the referee. The truth is certainly
somewhere in the middle, and that has led to much consternation in legal
scholarship on the topic.12
Largely on account of Professor Hart’s argument, the prediction theory
often is deemed applicable only to attorney decision making.13 Jerome Frank
took this position in his well-known 1931 article in which he emphasized that
legal rules play a relatively minor role in case resolution.14 As Murphy and
Coleman wrote, “[I]t is really a cheap shot to take a programmatic remark
such as ‘law is a prediction of what courts will decide’ . . . . Legal realism is,
in large measure, the lawyer’s perspective.”15 But still the point made by those
antagonistic to prediction theory is rather astute; yes, it may be well for
attorneys to predict how judges will rule, and perhaps we might classify this
as “law” of some sort, for surely it is, but it makes no sense to extend this
much further. After all, one would not argue that judges predict how they
themselves will decide cases. As Professor Dorf wrote, “A court of last resort
cannot sensibly ‘predict’ how it will rule.”16
This is where the present article begins. With advances in artificial legal
intelligence, prediction now can penetrate the work of all legal actors,
including judges—and not just in diversity or stay cases. Thus, legal
prediction, while retaining its centrality to debates about what the law is and
what it is that lawyers and judges are doing when they practice the law, also
grows in significance, as old limitations are cast aside and new computational
methods for making theory reality are implemented. In this article, I provide
an accounting for and explanation of legal prediction, and I do so as follows.
In Part I of this article, I seek “reflective equilibrium” across ten cases that
are pivotal in debates about the role of prediction in the law.17 After stating
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JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 35 (1990) (arguing that the insights of legal realism are mainly negative and
destructive, rather than constructive).
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 95 (1991)
(“[A]lthough practicing lawyers may be wise to look not to what courts say, but what they do, as a
means of predicting the outcome of a case, this is hardly an acceptable method for a judge to use in
deciding a case.”).
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption that Judges Behave
Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931).
Murphy and Coleman, supra note 12, at 35.
Dorf, supra note 3, at 659.
For an overview of the methodology of reflective equilibrium, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 48–51 (1971).
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the cases and their resolutions, I consider possible explanatory principles.
The desiderata that I set for a sound analysis are not only that the case results
are explained, but that the role of prediction in U.S. law is also explained
through the cases.
From this foundation, I present original empirical research exploring
judicial conceptions of legal prediction, including the extent to which judges
predict in their own acts of adjudication (Part II). This empirical research,
which includes nearly 200 currently sitting U.S. judges as participants,
provides important results regarding, inter alia, the workability of the Miller v.
Alabama holding18 and the usefulness of risk assessment tools.
In Part III, I develop a new framework for thinking about prediction in
the law. First, I identify how legal prediction problems should be classified
as predicting up (What will the prosecutor decide to do? What will a court
decide?) or predicting down (Will the defendant show up for court? Will he
recidivate while out on bail?). An example of a court predicting up is Barnette
v. West Virginia State Board of Education, where a lower court anticipated a shift
in higher court decision making.19 An example of a court predicting down is
Miller v. Alabama.20 By limiting life without parole sentences to only those
juveniles who are considered irreparably corrupt, the Court is asking
sentencers to predict whether a juvenile will be a danger decades down the
road and after a long prison sentence.21
I construct the framework so that it is useful for thinking about legal
prediction tools in these two contexts and how responses to legal prediction
ought to differ based on the class of prediction being undertaken. I outline
problems that inhere to these distinct classes of legal prediction, including
technological-legal lock-in22 and the non-trivial need for lay connection to
legal processes and outcomes.23 Overall, I show that this new framework is
necessary for addressing legal prediction problems. For instance, in the
specific area of bias in the law, the failure to properly classify legal prediction
problems has led to a lack of nuance in concluding when legal prediction

18
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567 U.S. 460 (2012).
47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Mary Marshall, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1633 (2019).
Rebecca Crootof, Cyborg Justice and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-in, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
ONLINE 233 (2019).
Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
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might be harmful and lead to entrenched biases and when it might result in
the opposite effect, that is, the lessening of bias in legal outcomes.
In Part IV, I show how the above-mentioned legal philosophical concerns
manifest in this updated account. Drawing on Rudolph Ritter von Ihering’s
work, where he argued for a shift from Begriffsjurisprudenz (law of concepts) to
Wirklichkeitsjurisprudenz (a law of outcomes/results),24 I discuss how this
bifurcation mirrors the divide between symbolic computational reasoning
and more data-driven forms, such as those that make use of deep learning.
The question is, do we predict as if we are drawing from “a rigid scheme of
deductions from a priori conceptions,”25 or do we rely instead on a Poundian
notion of a law of principles.26 If the latter, how can we advance neurosymbolic AI so that it can accommodate Pound or Holmes’s pragmatism? I
explore the outer reaches of this approach.
Throughout this article, we might think of there being four overarching
questions: in the context of the prediction model today, what are legal
decision makers doing, what should they be doing, what are they likely to do
moving forward, and what legal implications and considerations does their
behavior generate? I take up all of these questions, including the second,
although my discussion of the second is largely focused not on whether legal
prediction should be pursued, but whether, when it is undertaken, what it
ought to or might look like. In all, this article provides an unpacking of legal
prediction, forming a cornerstone to support both theory-driven and applied
thinking on the subject.
I. A LEGAL PREDICTION CANON
In Part I of this article, I seek “reflective equilibrium” across ten cases
that I deem central to discussions on the role of prediction in the law.27 After
stating the cases and their legal resolutions, I consider possible explanatory
principles. The desiderata that I set for a sound analysis are not only that I
explain the results but that I explain the role of prediction in U.S. law.
Moreover, in culling ten cases on which to focus, readers might be surprised
that some of these cases are well-known ones, not the fringe or hyper-recent

24
25
26
27

RUDOLPH RITTER VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (1877; trans. 1999).
Pound, supra note 23, at 608.
Id. at 613.
See Rawls, supra note 17.
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matters that one might expect to find in an article that considers artificial
legal intelligence, predictive analytics, and other rather cutting-edge topics.
However, I will show that these ten cases are what one needs to understand
the philosophical and practical considerations that attach to the issue of the
legal prediction, both for considering its history and for anticipating its near
future.
So where and when does legal prediction emerge?28 I will answer this
question more fully in the discussion that follows the presentation of the ten
cases. But, for now, to the knowledgeable reader, a few clear examples of
judicial prediction should come to mind. To start, judges sometimes
undertake prediction in diversity cases and in other similar matters.29 In
these cases, the federal court undertakes a specific prediction task:
determining how the state court would rule. Stay cases are another good
example. In such matters, for the purpose of quick decision making and
workload reduction,30 a single Justice is tasked with deciding whether to grant
a stay of a lower court’s judgment. The decision requires the Justice to
“forecast whether four Justices would vote to grant certiorari when the
petition is presented, predict the probable outcome of the case if certiorari
were granted, and balance the traditional stay equities. All of this requires
that a Justice cultivate some skill in the reading of tea leaves . . . .”31 Thus
acting as a surrogate for the Court, this solitary Justice likely must, as
Professor Dorf has written, “hazard a prediction as to what her colleagues
would do.”32
28

29

30
31
32

Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994); Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16
GA. L. REV. 357, 399 (1982) (discussing lower courts’ obligation to “replicate the result that would
be reached if the Supreme Court were faced with the same set of facts and allegations”). For an
argument that prediction theory is inappropriate in diversity cases and that support for it rests on a
flawed reading of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), see Dorf, supra note 3, at 655
(arguing that Erie is about federalism, not legal realism).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing supplemental jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1988) (authorizing jurisdiction in diversity cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) (“The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.”); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343 (1976) (involving a federal
question case in which the federal court is tasked with deciding whether state law recognizes a
property interest).
Lois J. Scali, Comment, Prediction Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of Stays by Individual Justices,
32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1026–27 (1985).
Bd. of Educ. v. Superior Ct., 448 U.S. 1343, 1347 (1980) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
Dorf, supra note 3, at 691.
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There are other instances, as well, which I will discuss below, especially
instances of prediction by non-judicial legal decision makers. But, without
further ado, let us consider the ten cases that I deem essential for
understanding legal prediction.
A. The Cases
Miller v. Alabama33
In summer 2003, Evan Miller and an accomplice murdered Cole
Cannon.34 Miller was 14 years old at the time; a year later, he was
transferred from juvenile court to a county circuit court so that he might be
tried as an adult.35 In 2006, he was indicted and, later, found guilty and
sentenced to life imprisonment. Miller filed a post-trial motion in which he
argued that life imprisonment is cruel and unusual punishment, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, when the person subject to the punishment is
merely 14 years old.36
In reviewing this matter, along with a companion case that had a similar
fact pattern and legal posture, the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed the question of whether the imposition of a life-without-parole
sentence on a 14-year-old violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment?37 The Court ruled that
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles were unconstitutional
unless the juvenile’s “crime reflect[ed] irreparable corruption.”38 According
to the decision, if a court concludes that a juvenile is incapable of change
during and following a long prison sentence, then a life without parole
sentence might be appropriate.39 While this determination was just one that
courts were charged with making and/or weighing—“an offender’s age and
the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it” should also
be considered40—it is the only of the characteristics that requires significant

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Id. at 467–68.
Id. at 467–69.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 479–80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573
(2005)).
Marshall, supra note 21, at 1654.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 476.
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prognostication. Moreover, as Mary Marshall has argued, and as I will vet
in Part II of this article, the prediction that Miller requires is not just unique;
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to make.41
State v. Loomis42
In early 2013, Eric Loomis was charged with five criminal counts related
to a drive-by shooting in Wisconsin.43 Loomis pleaded guilty to two lesser
charges—ones relating to the unauthorized use of a vehicle and attempting
to evade a traffic officer—and the remaining charges were dismissed,
although they were provided to the court for consideration at sentencing.44
In sentencing the defendant, the court relied on the COMPAS risk
assessment tool.45 This reliance is why Loomis has become a notable case.
COMPAS stands for “Correctional Offender Management Profiling for
Alternative Sanctions.”46 It is a “risk–need assessment system . . . that
incorporates a range of theoretically relevant criminogenic factors and key
factors emerging from meta-analytic studies of recidivism.”47 It provides a
prediction as to the likelihood that an offender will recidivate. The inputs for
this prediction include both an interview of the offender and criminal history
information.48 COMPAS is furnished by a private company, and its
methodology is a trade secret.49
Filing a motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court, Loomis argued
that the court’s reliance on COMPAS violated his due process rights.50 He
argued that the court’s use of the tool violated his right to individualization
to the extent that it relied on group-level statistics.51 Loomis also argued that

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Marshall, supra note 21, at 1654–64.
881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
“Brief of Defendant-Appellant,” at 1-3, State v. Loomis, Crim. A. No. 2015AP157, 2015 WL
1724741, at 1–2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2015).
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754.
“Brief of Defendant-Appellant,” at 1-3, State v. Loomis, Crim. A. No. 2015AP157, 2015 WL
1724741, at 9 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2015); see also Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 755.
Tim Brennan et al., Northpointe Inst. for Pub. Mgmt. Inc., Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the COMPAS
Risk and Needs Assessment System, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 21 (2009).
Id.
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 757.

April 2022]

PREDICTING, UP AND DOWN

489

the information contained in the report was not accurate.52 The postconviction motion was denied by the trial court.53 After the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed.54 I will elide the court’s discussion of
the accuracy issue, as it is not germane to this article. As for the
individualization claim, Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson agreed in her
concurring opinion that the predictive tool provided only aggregate data on
recidivism risk for groups similar to the offender and did not individualize;
however, she wrote that, because the predictive tool was not the sole basis for
the decision, the sentencing procedure was sufficiently individualized.55
Lessard v. Schmidt56
In the fall of 1971, Alberta Lessard was picked up in front of her
Wisconsin residence by two police officers and taken to a mental health
facility and held on an emergency basis.57 As the result of rulings from
various proceedings, Lessard was confined for 10 days, and this was soon
extended an additional 30 days.58 Lessard brought a class action in federal
district court in which she made a number of arguments regarding the
constitutionality of Wisconsin’s involuntary commitment statute.59 Most
germane to our purposes, however, was the Lessard’s court’s major
substantive finding that the statute could only be constitutional if it required
proof of “an extreme likelihood that if the [allegedly mentally ill] person is
not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others.”60 Specifically,
the court ruled that civil confinement can be justified in some cases, but a
finding of dangerousness must be based upon a “recent overt act, attempt, or
threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another.”61

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id.
Id.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 774–775 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
Arnold H. Landis, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Lessard v. Schmidt, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1276,
1276 (1974).
Id.
Michael J. Remington, Lessard v. Schmidt and Its Implications for Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wisconsin,
57 MARQ. L. REV. 65, 68–69 (1973).
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093.
See id.
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Lessard is recognized as the “first comprehensive federal court ruling on
the substantive and procedural Constitutional limitations for civil
commitment . . . .”62 But it is more important here for how it deals with the
issue of prediction. Part of the aim of involuntary commitment is to serve
the best interests of the state and the individual, such that the individual is
prevented from committing future acts that stand contrary to that aim. Of
course, this is a predictive exercise: will the party subject to the involuntary
commitment hearing commit detrimental or harmful acts if left unattended?
The Lessard court recognized the extreme difficulty of this prediction: it
discussed its distrust of predictions of future conduct, stating that
commitments based upon such predictions must be “viewed with
suspicion.”63 Thus, in light of the deprivations of liberty that are at hazard
when such a prediction is made, the court mandated that the evidentiary
inputs include recent and actual behavior.64 In other words, unless an
individual has recently committed, attempted to commit, or threatened to
commit substantial harm to themselves or others, a prediction of future
dangerousness is not warranted.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins65
On July 27, 1934, Harry Tompkins was walking along railroads tracks in
Pennsylvania when he was struck by something protruding from a moving
railcar.66 Tompkins filed suit in diversity in federal court in New York, as
the Erie Railroad Company was a New York corporation.67 In considering
what duty of care was owed by railroads in situations such as the one in which
Tompkins had found himself, federal common law (ordinary negligence) and
Pennsylvania state law (wanton negligence) had different standards.68 Thus,
the underlying question concerned which standard ought to be applied:
should federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state or federal
law?69
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

See Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 WIS.
L. REV. 503, 504.
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093.
See id.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See id. at 69.
See id.
See id. at 70.
See id. at 71.

April 2022]

PREDICTING, UP AND DOWN

491

A majority of the Court held that federal courts are not permitted to
create their own common law for issues that might be construed as properly
falling within state law.70 Justice Louis Brandeis, who wrote for the majority,
further argued that applying state substantive law in such situations would
lead to greater efficiency, largely by making outcomes more predictable.71 In
all, the ruling was that, in diversity jurisdiction cases, federal courts must
apply substantive state law and federal procedural law.72
But note well what Justice Brandeis wrote, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.:
[L]aw . . . does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The
common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law
or not, is not the common law generally, but the law of that State existing by
the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in
England or anywhere else.73

Justice Brandeis even explicitly endorsed Justice Holmes, Jr.’s
protestations against there being a transcendental body of law.74 In essence,
Justice Brandeis and the Court were saying that there is no law in an absolute
sense that a federal court might justly divine and apply. What is the law in
such a diversity action? It is what the highest state court would say it is.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Armstrong75
In relaying this case, I begin with the Court’s holding: “We predict that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not recognize an insurance
company’s common law right to rescind benefits payable to innocent third
parties under an assigned risk policy on the basis of a fraud or material
representation made by the policyholder.”76 In short, the federal court
explicitly predicted what the state court would do were it faced with the
matter.

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See id. at 79–80.
See id. at 74 (noting that the previous doctrine in Swift v. Tyson had not led to uniformity or certainty
in outcome).
See id. at 79–80.
Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533–35 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
See id.
949 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
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The background facts were as follows. A man (the “policyholder”) using
the name William J. O’Brian and/or William J. O’Brien had made material
misrepresentations on his application for a State Farm Assigned Risk
policy.77 The policyholder, who had taken out the policy as a Pennsylvania
driver, was subsequently in an auto accident, as a result of which a third party
was injured.78 This injured party attempted to recover from State Farm via
the policyholder’s policy.79 The policyholder could not be found, and the
district court entered a default judgment against him.80 State Farm then
sued, seeking declaratory judgment that: (1) the policy issued by State Farm
was void; (2) the policyholder had made material misrepresentations that
State Farm had relied upon to its detriment; and (3) State Farm did not have
a legal obligation to any party related to the void policy.81 State Farm lost in
the lower court, where it was held that State Farm had no common law right
to rescind third-party benefits under this automobile insurance policy.82
This question—whether Pennsylvania law recognizes the right of an
insurer to rescind a fraudulently obtained insurance policy in an action
brought by a third party against the fraudulent policyholder—had not been
decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and thus the Third Circuit was
tasked with resolving it without Pennsylvania precedent on which to rely.83
To render this prediction, the Third Circuit court first looked to similar—
although clearly distinct—matters decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.84 These matters contained plurality opinions, concurrences, and
dissents, and so the Third Circuit looked at the individual justices on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and predicted, one by one, how they might
rule in the present matter.85 For example, the Third Circuit court wrote,
“Given his plurality opinion in Bonnie Beck and his dissent in Klopp, we believe
that Justice McDermott would also endorse the view that rescission is not an

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

See id. (noting that the name on the insurance application did not match the corresponding drivers
license number on the application).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 100–01.
See id. at 100–01.
See id. at 101.
See id.
See id. at 102–03 (discussing two similar cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
interpreted statutes that governed the voluntary car insurance market).
See id. at 102–04.
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available remedy to Assigned Risk Plan providers.”86 Finally, even admitting
that the evidence it had marshalled was “only dicta,” the court was confident
in its predictive powers: “we find it unlikely that . . . the justices would vote
otherwise in this case.”87
Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education88
Two years before Barnette came before the district court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Minersville School District v. Gobitis.89 In Gobitis, the Court held that public
schools could compel students, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, who were
parties to this matter, to salute the American fag and recite the Pledge of
Allegiance, even when the students professed religious objections to these
practices.90 Virtually an identical issue was at issue in Barnette, and thus when
the case came before the district court, the school board defended itself with
a brief that relied heavily on Gobitis as controlling authority.91
However, Circuit Judge Parker, writing for the three-judge district court,
launched into speculation about how the individual Justices on the Supreme
Court might vote, aware as he was that the composition of the Supreme
Court had changed since Gobitis had been decided: Justice Robert H. Jackson
had joined the Court, as had Wiley Rutledge.
Of the seven justices now members of the Supreme Court who participated
in that decision, four have given public expression to the view that it is
unsound, the present Chief Justice in his dissenting opinion rendered therein
and three other justices in a special dissenting opinion in [ . . . ]. The
majority of the court in Jones v. City of Opelika, moreover, thought it worth
while to distinguish the decision in the Gobitis case, instead of relying upon
it as supporting authority.92

As Professor Dorf has pointed out, Judge Parker was not treating the
Court as a unified whole; rather, he was surmising why the Justices had voted
how they had, inferring that at least one of the five Justices in the Opelika

86
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88
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Id. at 103.
Id. at 104.
47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Id. at 599–600.
Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 252.
Id. at 253.
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majority must have disapproved of Gobitis and thus might join the other four
Justices who had publicly expressed disapproval of the ruling.93
Relying on this prediction, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
and invalidated the statute that made flag saluting compulsory in West
Virginia public schools. The prediction proved correct: in its review of the
Barnette decision, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled its earlier
Gobitis decision.94
United States v. Girouard95
In Girouard, a Canadian sought U.S. citizenship but was unwilling to bear
arms in the country’s defense because he identified as a conscientious
objector for religious reasons (he was a Seventh Day Adventist). Circuit
Judge Mahoney, writing for a majority on the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
denied the petition.96 He cited multiple Supreme Court precedents that
explicitly denied citizenship to similarly situated applicants and stated that
Congress “has passed no legislation expressly changing the meaning [of the
citizenship statute] as interpreted by the Supreme Court . . . .”97 In short,
Judge Mahoney pointed out that there was controlling precedent and that
the ruling was thus straightforward to make.
Circuit Judge Woodbury dissented. Acknowledging his “duty as an
inferior federal judge to accept and follow controlling decisions of the
Supreme Court,” Judge Woodbury still felt that his role was one of
prediction.98 He had a “duty to prophesy,” since “[n]othing is to be gained
by our deciding a question contrary to the way we think the Supreme Court
would decide it.”99 In predicting how the Court would rule when faced with
this matter, Judge Woodbury went Justice by Justice, detailing how they had
decided other cases and especially what they had written as dicta in their
dissents.100 He concluded that “the prediction can be ventured that the

93
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95
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Dorf, supra note 3, at 663.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (overruling Gobitis).
149 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
Id. at 761, 763.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 765.
Id.
Id. at 765–67.
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above cases [i.e., the precedential cases] are no longer expressive of the
law.”101
What did the Supreme Court do? It granted certiorari,102 and it reversed
the judgment of the Circuit Court,103 proving Judge Woodbury’s prediction
correct—although the Court did not comment on Judge Woodbury’s dissent
nor on whether Judge Woodbury was right to tack, as he did, against
precedent and in favor of prediction.
In re Roche104
In this application for a stay of enforcement of an order finding a reporter
who had refused to disclose the identities of his new sources to be in civil
contempt, Justice Brennan served as Circuit Justice, tasked with deciding the
matter on behalf of the other Justices. The opinion is a mere four pages, and
it is worth reading a selection from it to see how Justice Brennan forecast the
votes of his fellow Justices. Here is some of the evidence he garnered in
powering his prediction: “[T]wo of my Brethren found the prospects for
review by the full Court insufficient to warrant staying contempt proceedings
against a New York Times reporter . . . .”105 “Four dissenting Justices in
Branzburg discerned at least some protection in the First Amendment for
confidences garnered during the course of newsgathering.”106 “And Mr.
Justice POWELL, who joined the Court in Branzburg, wrote separately to
emphasize . . . .”107 With insights such as these into the other individual
Justices, Justice Brennan then made his prediction: “[I]t is reasonably
probable that four of my Brothers will vote to grant certiorari . . . .”108
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.109
In Rodriguez, an investment dispute resulted in claims of unauthorized and
fraudulent transactions, some of which related to the Securities Act of
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Id. at 767.
326 U.S. 714 (1945).
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946).
448 U.S. 1312 (1980).
Id. at 1315.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1316.
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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1933.110 The District Court ordered that those claims that related to the
Securities Act could not be submitted for arbitration but must proceed in the
court action, as Wilko v. Swan111 directly controlled the matter.112 The Court
of Appeals, however, reversed.113 In reviewing post-Wilko decisions by the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals determined that the Supreme Court
had reduced Wilko to “obsolescence.”114 Thus, the Court of Appeals was
comfortable breaking with the precedent, as it believed the Supreme Court
would overrule it if presented with the opportunity.
The court of appeals was correct in its prediction: on review, the Supreme
Court overruled Wilko.115 But, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
explicitly admonished the court of appeals for ruling in accordance with its
prediction, even though the prediction proved correct: “We do not suggest
that the Court of Appeals on its own authority should have taken the step of
renouncing Wilko.”116
In a dissent from the holding, Justice Stevens nevertheless was of one
mind with Justice Kennedy: “[T]he Court of Appeals . . . engaged in an
indefensible brand of judicial activism.”117 There is a striking paragraph that
follows this pronouncement. Justice Stevens goes on to give reasons as to
why Wilko ought not to be overruled and why the argumentation in the
present case represents one’s beliefs about deference to congressional acts.118
“In the final analysis, a Justice’s vote in a case like this depends more on his
or her views about the respective lawmaking responsibilities of Congress and
this Court than on conflicting policy interests.”119 In other words, there is a
sense in which Justice Stevens was telling the court of appeals that, while they
may have correctly predicted how the Court would act, they did not correctly
predict how Justice Stevens would act, and for that they must be taken to task
for having the gall to predict in the first place.
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Id. at 478.
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 479.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 487.
Id.

April 2022]

PREDICTING, UP AND DOWN

497

Planned Parenthood v. Casey120
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court of the United States established that
abortion is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and that women have a privacy interest protecting
their right to abortion pursuant to the liberty clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.121 At issue in Planned Parenthood was the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act of 1982, five provisions of which were challenged by the plaintiffs
as unconstitutional under Roe.122 These provisions limited how and when
individuals might receive an abortion. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that all the provisions were unconstitutional,
but the court of appeals reversed in part, holding that only one of the
provisions was unconstitutional.123 For the purposes of this article, the
decision is notable for the extensive discussion of stare decisis that it incited. In
short, we might wonder, how can the Supreme Court predict its own
behavior, and when might it change its mind about its own past decisions?
In a plurality opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, Justice
O’Connor wrote that, while there is an obligation to follow precedent, that
obligation is not an inexorable command, and it is not without an outer
limit.124 That outer limit she defined as when “a prior judicial ruling should
come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very
reason doomed.”125 She went on to elucidate specific circumstances that the
Court might weigh when considering whether to reverse itself: does the rule
defy practical workability?126 Would overruling it lead to inequity?127 Have
related legal principles so developed as to render the current case a vestige,
an abandoned doctrine?128 And has there been a significant change in facts
such that the old rule does not apply or is not justified in its application?129
Justice O’Connor concluded by arguing that “doctrinal disposition” alone is
not enough: if the 1992 Court has a different doctrinal disposition than the
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113, 154–56 (1973).
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 844.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 854.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855.
Id.
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1973 Court, that is no reason to overturn a decision made by the 1973
Court.130
B. Reflective Equilibrium
What possible explanatory principles course through these ten cases?
The main issues that I will discuss and from which principles will be drawn
include the following. First, there is the issue of, as Professor Dorf put it, law
as found vs. law as made.131 Is there something absolute—the law itself—
that transcends the decisions of legal actors? Moreover, if that question gets
at a normative debate, then what is the practical aspect of it; that is, how are
judges actually behaving? Second, there is the issue of what matters when
prediction is undertaken—what factors come into play? Third, there is the
question of when and where legal prediction is undertaken—who is
predicting what?
I begin with the first issue. In Barnette, the District Court wrote, “It is true
that decisions are but evidences of the law and not the law itself; but the
decisions of the Supreme Court must be accepted by the lower courts as
binding upon them if any orderly administration of justice is to be
attained.”132 This almost perfectly mirrors the analogy that H. L. A. Hart
proffered133 and which I modernized and discussed above. In a pickup game
of basketball, one in which there is no referee, the players abide by the rules.
Once a referee is introduced, the referee interprets and applies the rules, but
that does not mean that the rules should be reduced to whatever the referee
says they are.
But consider the following. In Part II of this article, I present the results
of an original empirical study in which currently sitting U.S. judges were the
participants. One of the judges wrote to me with this thought:
[I]t was curious that the survey made a distinction between ‘the law’ and the
law as determined by the appellate courts. There is no law, except as
determined by the appellate courts. [ . . . ] I once decided, in a criminal case,
that a search was unconstitutional, and granted a motion to suppress. The
case was heard by a three judge panel at the Court of Appeals, and then by
the nine members of the state Supreme Court. Seven of the appellate court
130
131
132
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Id. at 864.
Dorf, supra note 3, at 709.
Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), aff’d, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
Hart, supra note 4, at 138–44.
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members said my decision was correct, and five said it was not. Was I correct
on the law? No, because the five appellate judges who decided I was wrong
were all on the Supreme Court.

Even if this approach seems reasonable, to adopt it is to hazard adopting
an untenable position. Recall Circuit Judge Woodbury’s dissent in United
States v. Girouard.134 There, he pointed out that, though the majority likely
was following precedent and adhering to the demands of stare decisis, the
Court had a duty to be, as my judicial participant stated, “correct,” where to
be correct is to be in accordance with how the Supreme Court—or one’s
highest state court—would rule. As we saw in Girouard:
I conceive it to be our judicial duty to decide cases as we think they should
be decided, but as an intermediate appellate court one of the factors, and a
highly important one, for us to take into consideration in concluding how we
should decide a case is the view which we think the Supreme Court would
take on the question at issue before us.135

Such a predictive approach is only truly apposite when the Court has
unequivocally not addressed a specific issue and a lower court is forced to
consider an issue of first impression. Otherwise, we know that ruling in
accordance with how one predicts the Supreme Court would rule is
forbidden: let us remember the rebukes that resounded through the Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. opinion, the Court angry at the appeals
court for predicting correctly but in contravention of precedent.136 After all,
much if not all legal thought holds that lower courts must adhere to
precedentwithout considering how higher courts may rule on appeal.137 Stare
decisis is the term for a judicially-created rule that courts must “abide by, or
adhere to, decided cases.”138 “Let stand what is decided, and do not disturb
what is settled”—this is the common law doctrine from which the term
arises.139 There is hierarchy to lack of precedentas well: when the Supreme
Court of the United States has not issued a decision on a particular issue, the
decisions of the court of appeals for a particular circuit are binding on the
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149 F.2d 760, 764 (1st Cir. 1945) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
Id. at 765.
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (overruling a past
case and simultaneously admonishing the court of appeals for taking the same step).
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 28, at 5–6 (arguing this precise point).
Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
“Stare decisis et non quieta movere.” Coyne v. Westinghouse Corp. (In re Globe Illumination),
149 B.R. 614, 617 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993), quoting Jeremy C. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
¶ 0.402[1] (2d ed. 1992).
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lower courts within that circuit.140 In fact, what many have failed to
acknowledge is that there are two distinct prediction problems: rather than
predict how higher courts would rule on the matter at hand if faced with it,
lower courts might predict how a higher court will rule on the lower court’s
decision. This is still a predictive exercise, as the lower court is only interested
in the absolute understanding of the law to the extent that it bears upon the
decision-making of the higher court.
This issue of law as found vs. law as made is important because a judge
who adheres to the prediction model also must discount the importance of
law as found. Whether or not there is some “correct” interpretation of the
law, the judge would only care about predicting what the higher court thinks
the “correct” interpretation is, and such a determination is a far cry from
embarking upon an independent search for the truth of the matter. Of
course, as the Barnette Court pointed out, what the Supreme Court says is
binding,141 so there is a meaningful sense in which predicting what the
Supreme Court will do is in fact representative of a search for the truth of the
matter. Although we are not so naïve as to pretend that there is no space
between the two conceptions, as Hart and as any astute commentary
concedes.
Indeed, such space is most evident when we consider the task that the
Supreme Court undertakes. There, especially with constitutional matters,
stare decisis is not absolute. However, it is not an empty doctrine either. As
we saw in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court may overrule itself, but if it
does, it will spill much ink making sure that practitioners and the lay public
believe that truly exceptional circumstances (or truly exceptional changes in
circumstances) have led to the overruling. And yet, even here, even at the
Supreme Court, there is still doubt regarding whether there is law as found.
Justice Brandeis, let us remember, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, endorsed Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s protestations against there being a
transcendental body of law.142
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Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that District Courts are
“bound by the law of their own circuit”); In re Globe Illumination, 149 Bankr. C.D. Cal at 617
(same); In re Taffi, 144 Bankr. C.D. Cal 105, 108 (same).
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Even though we have reached an impasse, if we turn to the practical
matter of prediction, we see that judges think less about courts as unified
wholes and more about individual justices with idiosyncratic beliefs. We saw
this in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, the diversity case
in which the Third Circuit, in making a prediction, looked at individual state
court justices and tallied votes.143 We also saw it in In re Roche, the stay case
in which Justice Brennan, in making his prediction, looked at individual
Supreme Court justices and tallied votes.144
Given this, what might prediction involve that is missing from the ideal
conception of the law? The answer is implicit in the above-described judicial
behavior: individual personality is what is missing. In addition to
conventional legal materials, a lower court judge seeking to replicate the
result that would be reached if the Supreme Court were faced with the same
set of facts and allegations likely would consider the views of the individual
justices who sit on the high court as a basis for predicting how those particular
justices would rule.145
Having addressed the normative debate and its practical manifestations,
including the emphasis that has come to fall on individual judges rather than
on courts, I now can turn to the third issue that is evident in our canon of
legal prediction cases. Where and when does legal prediction emerge? The
answer is that it tends to work up the legal hierarchy, just as one might climb
up a ladder. A lawyer faced with a legal question might predict what the
most likely legal or quasi-legal decision maker will decide (jurors, judges,
insurance adjusters, or—in the case of plea bargaining—prosecutors, and so
on), and he or she might predict what the highest (in the hierarchy) possible
decision maker might rule (a state supreme court, or the Supreme Court of
the United States). The intermediate legal decision makers (let us call them
the “lower courts” for ease of discussion) might predict what their
hierarchical counterparts will do—when faced with such a matter and/or
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949 F.2d 99, 103–104 (3d Cir. 1991) (looking at individual Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices
to predict how they would decide an issue).
In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315–1316 (1980) (predicting Supreme Court Justice votes and
concluding “it is reasonably probable that four [Justices] will grant certiorari”).
Dorf, supra note 3, at 654.
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when faced with the decision of the lower (in the hierarchy) decision maker’s
decision.146
The lower courts also may predict down the ladder, so to speak,
predicting the behavior of legal parties, such as whether defendants pose a
danger to society or whether a party, if held liable, will adhere to the court’s
ruling. In my canon of legal prediction, we saw this play out in Miller v.
Alabama (predicting future criminality), Lessard v. Schmidt (predicting
dangerousness), and State v. Loomis (predicting down with the aid of
automated prediction tools).
Lastly, the highest court might undertake the seemingly nonsensical
predictive task of predicting what it might do itself, although we know it is
not impossible, as we saw how, in stay cases, a member of the Court may be
tasked with predicting the whole of the Court.147 In other words, the
Supreme Court might predict its own rulings, which of course is something
akin to the process of following its own precedent, but I discuss that in more
detail in Parts III and IV of this article. While this is the general flow of legal
prediction, it does not fully capture the constraints under which each party
might pursue such predictions. In the figure that follows, and in the
succeeding paragraph, I outline both the predictive flow and the constraints
on that flow.
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Note a curiosity that arises here, one that, in actuality, holds promise for addressing issues relating
to efficiency, heavy docket loads, and the like. In a tort, if a plaintiff and a defendant both make
the same prediction, then there would be a strong incentive to settle, to forgo adjudication.
Likewise, if a defendant and a prosecutor both make the same prediction, there would be a strong
incentive to forgo trial and reach a plea.
In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1316 (1980) (predicting “there is a fair prospect that the court will
reverse the decision below”).
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Figure 1. Flow chart of both predictive agents and objects and the forces
that constrain the use of prediction-driven decision making. Note that the
figure is just an overview and does not include all predictive objects; for
instance, the Supreme Court predicts what officials would do in response to
incentives proposed legal rules might create, how the public might respond
to its rulings, and so on.
For lawyers, on a practical level, it makes sense to predict how the highest
court that is likely to review the matter with which it is faced will rule. What
the law means in the abstract is largely irrelevant beyond the extent to which
a lawyer’s reading of the law might sway the decision-making of the highest
court that reviews the matter. But lawyers are still constrained in that their
predictions must be so reasonable as not to trigger legal malpractice claims
by their clients. That is, one might believe that one’s interpretation of the
law is in perfect accord with the law’s true and correct meaning, but if no
judge and nary another party agrees with that interpretation, then one
arguably has failed at the job of lawyering.
For lower courts, there is some tension in whether they can distinguish
the law “in absolute terms” from how higher court judges would rule, given
that higher court precedent is binding and controlling. In a sense, as one of
the judicial participants from Part II wrote, “Following the law means
following precedent that is binding on me.” Or, as another judicial
participant wrote, “A judge should always look to what the law requires, but
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‘what the law requires’ is defined in many instances by what higher courts
have decided.” But we can understand, as seen in the cases presented in Part
I, that the law might still transcend precedent and higher court rulings, and
judges have room to consider the law in and of itself, absent consideration of
past or future higher court rulings. For the highest court (we might think of
the Supreme Court of the United States), its justices also are constrained by
precedent, although outside of diversity matters and other similar matters,
that precedent is largely the Court’s own (and also not always constraining).
Thus, in the vast majority of cases, including cases of first impression, the
Court considers the law in absolute terms, and any prediction that is possible
would be prediction about how the Court, as then constituted, would rule on
the matter at hand. This might seem like an inane or impossible exercise,
but I argue that it is not. Indeed, it is precisely the exercise that lower court
judges take up, in part, when considering a matter about which there is no
clear precedent.148 When there is clear precedent, the prediction should be
easy enough, unless, as discussed in Planned Parenthood, there is some “special
reason.”149
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON LEGAL PREDICTION
In Part II, I present the results of original empirical research in which 181
currently sitting U.S. judges participated. The judges were asked about the
ideas that were put forth in Part I of this article. In particular, there are three
topic groupings, and the results are presented within these groupings. First,
I broached the judges’ beliefs regarding the conception of the law as
transcending the higher courts vs. the law as virtually equivalent to higher
court judicial rulings. In addition to questions about what is required of a
lower court judge in terms of following precedent, this also includes
considerations of whether, even if one does follow precedent, the likelihood
of being overruled weighs upon judicial decision making. Second, I explored
judges’ beliefs regarding how well they could predict—both up and down the
ladder, as described above and shown in Figure 1. In this part of the survey,
I gathered important data regarding the feasibility of the legal rule imposed
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And it is what, in stay cases, a single justice does on behalf of the whole Court, in a synecdoche-like
version of the type of prediction I am discussing.
505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
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by the Miller v. Alabama Court.150 I also explored which factors the judges
considered most important for predicting up, and whether risk assessments
are useful to them when they predict down. Third, I queried the judges
about their beliefs regarding how well others can predict their (the judges’)
decision making.
A. Methodology and Results
The survey was approved by Princeton University’s Institutional Review
Board. One hundred and eighty-one judges completed the full survey.151
Mean age was 61 years old, almost 75% were male, and 91% were
White/Caucasian. Seventy-eight percent were sitting on a state-level trial
court, 7% on a state-level appeals court, 2% on a state-level highest court,
7% on a federal district court, 1% on a federal court of appeals, and 5%
indicated other, which mostly meant a bankruptcy court. The survey
consisted of a series of questions, which I now discuss concurrent to
presenting the results.152
1. Idealist vs. realist; absolute vs. predictive
The first set of questions concerned the varying conceptions of the law—
law as transcending the higher courts vs. the law as virtually equivalent to
higher court judicial rulings. Participants were asked, “When a legal matter
is being decided, which of the following should be the focus of the judges
making the decision: (1) what result the law requires, or (2) how higher court
judges would rule on the matter?”153 As seen in Figure 2, most participants
indicated that what result the law requires was relatively more important
than how higher court judges would rule.

150
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567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (holding “mandatory life [sentence] without parole for those under the
age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and
unusual punishments’”).
The survey was sent via email to 2,155 U.S. judges. The emails were culled through THE
AMERICAN BENCH (2018).
For the complete survey questions, along with the order in which they were presented, see Appendix
A. For data, see Appendix B.
As is common in the social sciences, I relied on a dichotomy in this question, as it is the dichotomy
that I think accurately represents the situation at-hand. Granted, there might be other choices that
lurked in participants’ minds, and these might be explored in future studies.
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Figure 2. The judicial participants indicated whether judges’ foci should
be solely on what the law requires (score of 0), solely on how higher court
judges would rule (score of 100), or equally focused on both (a score of 50,
indicated by the blue dotted line). The y-axis (“Count”) indicates the
percentage selecting within each bin, and the red shaded region is a density
plot, which shows a smoothed distribution of the points along the axis. The
mean is 27.
As discussed in Part I, this question can only take us so far in our
understanding. After all, what the law requires includes how higher court
judges have ruled (if there is controlling precedent), and it does not necessarily
include how they would rule, although the two certainly may overlap (they
usually rule in accordance with how they have ruled—but not always). What
is interesting, though, is the overall result: regardless of what they do, judges
profess that they should shy away from a prediction model of ruling. They
indicate that the focus should be more on what the law requires and less on
what higher court judges would or would not do if faced with the same
matter.
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I dove deeper into both ends of this prompt. On the one end, I asked the
judges to indicate their agreement with the following statements about
predicting higher court decisions:
• “When deciding a legal matter, I attempt to replicate the result that
would be reached if my state’s highest court were faced with the same
matter.”
• “When deciding a legal matter, I attempt to replicate the result that
would be reached if the Supreme Court of the United States were
faced with the same matter.”
The first question was analyzed only for state court trial and appeals
judges, as it was not applicable to the other participants. The scale ran from
0 (not at all) to 100 (definitely). The results are depicted in Figure 3. In
summary, the mean for replicating the state highest court was 56, and the
mean for replicating the Supreme Court of the United States was 52. Thus,
such replication/prediction does, it would seem, play a role in judicial
decision making. While it may not be as important as the law itself (as we
saw in Figure 2), it is impactful.

Figure 3. The judicial participants indicated their agreement with the
statements “When deciding a legal matter, I attempt to replicate the result
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that would be reached if my state’s highest court were faced with the same
matter” and “When deciding a legal matter, I attempt to replicate the result
that would be reached if the Supreme Court of the United States were faced
with the same matter,” where 0 = not at all and 100 = definitely.
Finally, the judges were again asked about the importance of considering
the law in an absolute sense: “When deciding a legal matter, I consider what
the law requires in an absolute sense. (Please interpret ‘in an absolute sense’
as indicating the following: the law transcends the question of how higher
court judges would rule if faced with the matter.).” They also were queried
about an iteration of what is presented in Figures 2 and 3. Rather than
whether they seek to replicate what higher court judges would do if faced
with the same matter, they were asked whether they seek to avoid reversal:
“When deciding a legal matter, I consider whether my decision would be
reversed by a higher court.” As before, the scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to
100 (definitely). For the law in an absolute sense prompt, the mean was 73
(with a standard deviation of 27), showing that this is serious concern of
judges. For the reversal prompt, the mean was 48 (standard deviation of 37).

April 2022]

PREDICTING, UP AND DOWN

509

Figure 4. “Absolute” refers to “When deciding a legal matter, I consider
what the law requires in an absolute sense. (Please interpret ‘in an absolute
sense’ as indicating the following: the law transcends the question of how
higher court judges would rule if faced with the matter.).” “Reversal” refers
to “When deciding a legal matter, I consider whether my decision would be
reversed by a higher court.” The scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100
(definitely). These data are visualized in two forms. At top is a boxplot; at
bottom is a violin plot. The advantage of the violin plot is that it shows the
full distribution of the data. That is, it is similar to the boxplot, except that
it also shows the probability density of the data at different values. It is
included here in order to show the bimodal outcome. For the reversal
prompt, the mean and median, as seen in the boxplot, are at about the scale
midpoint. However, as seen in the violin plot, there are two clusters, one at
the lower end and one at the higher end. In short, the judges either definitely
do or definitely do not consider reversal; very few are in the middle. In
contrast, for the prompt on the law as transcending the question of how
higher court judges would rule if faced with the matter, nearly all judges
indicated that this is definitely something they consider when making a
ruling.
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From this first line of questions, a few insights can be gleaned. Prediction
plays a role in judicial considerations, as lower court judges think about both
how higher court judges would rule if faced with the same matter and
whether higher court judges will reverse them on appeal, although the story
for this latter consideration is mixed: some judges deny spending much if any
time pondering potential reversal. That said, even more than looking up the
hierarchy, what judges care about most is what the law requires in an
absolute sense. This may, of course, subsume some element of prediction, as
properly applying precedent does require properly understanding how the
higher court would rule if faced with the matter, but given the dyadic
presentation of the question displayed in Figure 2, I feel confident that we
can tease these apart and glimpse some light between legal idealism and legal
realism, with the former receiving greater claimed allegiance from sitting
judges.
2. Judges predicting
I broached the topic of predicting up in Part I. Moreover, in the survey
results discussed above, we saw the extent to which predicting up influences
judicial decision making. Now I asked a series of follow up questions: how
good are lower court judges at predicting the decision-making of those higher
up on the judicial hierarchy? In particular, I asked the participants the extent
to which they believe they can accurately predict their judicial peers, their
state’s highest court, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Figure 5. The judicial participants were asked to what extent they
agreed with the following statements: “I can accurately predict how my
judicial peers (specifically, those judicial peers whom I know well) will rule on
specific legal matters.” “I can accurately predict how my state’s highest court
will rule on specific legal matters.” “I can accurately predict how the
Supreme Court of the United States will rule on specific legal matters.” The
scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100 (definitely).
As Figure 5 shows, the judges were confident in their ability to predict
up. This was especially true in their own states, where there was virtually no
difference between their confidence in predicting their judicial peers (mean
= 63) and predicting their state’s highest court (mean = 59); the difference
between the two was not significant, neither by a two-tailed t-test (p = .21)
nor when the t-test was adjusted using Tukey’s HSD (p = .44).
Embedded within such prediction is the question of what features judges
rely upon when predicting up. To shed light on this, I asked the participants,
“If you were attempting to predict the result that would be reached if the
Supreme Court of the United States were faced with a specific legal matter,
as a basis for predicting the ruling, to what extent would you consider the
following: published opinions by the justices; the justices’ non-judicial
writings and speeches; the justices’ general ideological commitments; your
personal knowledge of and casual conversations with the justices, if any.” As
before, the scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100 (definitely).
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Figure 6. The judicial participants indicated how important these
factors are when predicting Supreme Court rulings.
The judges hewed to the official story, with published opinions holding
by far the greatest weight. Even ideology, which often is viewed by the public
as a significant factor in Supreme Court decision making, came in quite low
(mean of 31) compared to published opinions (mean of 89).
In addition to questions regarding predicting up, I also asked the judges
about predicting down. Here, the prediction tasks are more particular and
discrete, so I asked about two specific ones: future behavior of adult and
juvenile defendants/offenders. Note, for these responses, the data analysis is
limited to responses by those judges who indicated that they handle at least
some criminal cases, a criterium that still included 91% of the participants.
For the first of these, I asked the judges to what extent they agreed with
the following statement: “On the whole, I can accurately predict how
criminal defendants will behave during the post-arrest and pretrial period
(i.e., if released on bail, whether they will commit additional offenses,
whether they will show up for subsequent court dates, etc.).” For the second
item, I asked about a prediction task that was established by the Supreme
Court in Miller v. Alabama.154 As discussed above, in Miller, the Court banned
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles and declared that only
the “juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” should be
made to spend the rest of his or her life in prison.155 I asked the judges, “To
what extent do you agree with this statement: I can predict whether a juvenile
is ‘irreparably corrupt’; that is, I can predict whether a juvenile will be a
danger decades from now and after a long prison sentence.”

154
155

567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Id. at 479–80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573
(2005)).
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Figure 7. The judicial participants indicated how well they can predict
whether a juvenile will be a danger in the distant future and whether a postarrest and pretrial (PAPT) adult offender will behave appropriately if
released on bail.
While the judges professed a moderate level of confidence in their bail
decision making (mean of 50), they showed virtually no confidence in their
ability to perform the prediction task that the Miller Court asked them to
perform (mean of 27). A two-tailed t-test showed a significant difference in
these confidence ratings, with p-value < .001 and Cohen’s d = .9, which is a
large effect size. In other words, while judges might have some confidence
in their bail decision making, they have no confidence in their ability to do
what the Miller Court has asked them to do.
Lastly, the judges were asked about a key issue in predicting down: are
risk assessments helpful? Specifically, they were asked to what extent they
agreed with the following: “When trying to predict how criminal defendants
will behave during the post-arrest and pretrial period (i.e., if released on bail,
whether they will commit additional offenses, whether they will show up for
subsequent court dates, etc.), it is helpful for me to have access to data-driven
predictions, such as risk assessment tools.”
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The results were overwhelming. Ninety-nine percent of judges indicated
that risk assessment tools have at least some value (score of greater than 0).
Even more, 83% indicated that risk assessment tools showed significant value
(score greater than or equal to 50). The mean was above the midpoint: 65
(standard deviation of 25).

Figure 8. Do judges find risk assessment tools helpful? The answer was
overwhelmingly in the affirmative.
3. Others predicting judges
Judges predicting is just one piece of the prediction model. There also
are others who might be tasked with predicting judges: lawyers, for instance,
as is discussed throughout this article; and machines or computational
models, as in the Supreme Court Forecasting Project.156 But are such outside
predictors any good? I asked judges this very question. First, to provide a
baseline—and to check it against the result reported in the preceding

156

Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court
Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
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section—I asked to what extent the judicial participants agreed with this
statement: “My judicial peers who know me well can predict with accuracy
how I will rule on specific legal matters.” The mean (69) was slightly higher
than when the judges were asked how well they predict their judicial peers
(63). In other words, the judicial participants had greater confidence that
others could accurately predict their decision making than that they could
accurately predict others’ decision making. They had slightly more
confidence that attorneys (“The average attorney who knows me well can
predict with accuracy how I will rule on specific legal matters.”) could predict
their decisions (mean of 71), but this was not significantly greater than their
confidence that judicial peers could predict their decisions (p = .10). Finally,
they were asked to indicate their agreement with two statements regarding
data-driven prediction tools. “It is currently possible to build a model (for
example, a data-driven artificial intelligence) that can predict with accuracy
how I will rule on specific legal matters.” “Within the next 10 years, it will
be possible to build a model (for example, a data-driven artificial intelligence)
that can predict with accuracy how I will rule on specific legal matters.” As
is evident in Figure 9, they had significantly more confidence in the human
predictors than in the computational ones, even when giving the AI ten more
years during which to improve.
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Figure 9. How accurate do judges think lawyers, judicial peers, and
current and future (10 years from now) artificially intelligent tools are at
predicting judicial decisions? The scale ranged from 0 (not at all accurate) to
100 (definitely accurate).
B. Summary of Key Empirical Findings
First, when it comes to a judicial notion of Justice Holmes’s prediction
model, it appears that prediction factors into judicial behavior but is less a
factor than are concerns about what the law, in an absolute sense,
demands.157 In lay terms, judges try to rule in accordance with the law (that
is, they try to “get it right,” as one participant wrote to me), and that might
include predicting how higher courts would rule on the same matter, which
can be a question of stare decisis, of course. But this does not necessarily have
much to do with predicting whether or not they will be subsequently
reversed. When it comes to this subset of judicial legal prediction, there is a
split in opinion: some judges care deeply about reversal, others do not, and
very few are in the middle.
Moreover, on this same issue of predicting up, judges believe they can do
it well, especially within their own states.158 When making such predictions,
judges rely most heavily on higher court judges’ published opinions. In other
words, they follow precedent and the principles of stare decisis in trying to
ferret out what judges might do in the future. Two questions emerge from
this. One, according to other research on judicial decision making, does this
factor—published opinions—account for judicial rulings? Two, while lower
court judges might profess to rely most heavily on higher court judges’
published opinions, is this only true for the average, banal matter? That is,
is it possible that published opinions matter much less when the legal issue is
novel or the case a so-called “edge” case?
For this first question, consider the Supreme Court Forecasting Project
in which researchers predicted the outcomes of cases heard during a single
Supreme Court Term.159 Did published opinions matter? In essence they
did, as the model had to be trained on something, and past opinions are the
bedrock of the law, the shifting sands which, taken together and taken across

157
158
159

See Figures 2–4.
See Figure 5.
Ruger et al., supra note 156.
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time, make up a beach that is relatively consistent—or, at least, identifiable.
But the modelers pulled out just a few factors from those opinions (issue area
of the case, whether there was a constitutional claim), and what was as
important—or more important—were factors like ideological direction of
the lower court ruling, whether the state was a petitioner, and so on. In
essence, we might conclude that the judges are right and are accurate in
claiming the importance of published opinions (as we saw, supra, in In re
Roche160), but we also can adumbrate additional factors that play a role.
For the second question, we have already hinted at the extent to which
ideological direction and idiosyncrasies of individual justices matter for edge
cases. Recall the flurry of petitions for rehearing that quickly followed on the
heels of Clarence Thomas’s 1991 Supreme Court confirmation.161
Moreover, in Part I, I discussed Barnette, wherein a change in the composition
of the Court was correctly perceived as the factor that would change the
Court’s decision making.162 And general and lay opinion focuses on the
importance of ideology and other factors for these edge cases, as is evident in
the trenchant battles that ensue whenever a judge is up for Supreme Court
confirmation.
The empirical work also provides important insights into judges
predicting down. First, they are not overly confident in their ability to do so,
especially in line with the Miller holding,163 and they want data-driven tools,
such as risk assessments, to help guide their decision making.164 This latter
conclusion may come as something of a surprise given the negative
reputation that risk assessment tools have,165 but it is worth noting and worth
considering as policy and legal decisions are made concerning their use. This
latter point also raises a curious inconsistency: while judges would like more
computational guidance as they predict down, they have relatively little
confidence in the ability of computational tools to predict up.166 On the one
hand, this inconsistency lends credence to arguments against the use of risk
assessment tools—although I will discuss risk assessment tools in more detail
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

448 U.S. 1312 (1980).
Dorf, supra note 3, at 652.
47 F. Supp. 251, 252–53 (S.D. W. Va. 1942).
See Figure 7.
See Figure 8.
Gwen Van Eijk, Socioeconomic Marginality in Sentencing: The Built-In Bias in Risk Assessment Tools and the
Reproduction of Social Inequality, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 463 (2017).
See Figure 9.
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in Parts III and IV. More importantly, I suspect it reflects general distaste
individuals have for being the object of machine prediction, but this is a
matter that must be empirically tested in the future.
On this same point, the results show how little insight judges have into
the ability of statistical forecasters to predict their behavior—and the extent
to which judges misvalue human (vs. machine) prediction. Almost two
decades ago, researchers pitted a statistical model against legal experts in
predicting the outcomes of every case argued during the 2002 Supreme
Court Term.167 The experts included luminaries from top law schools and
law firms around the country.168 The model did not even take into account
information about the specific law or facts of the cases. Indeed, it only
considered six factors: (1) circuit of origin; (2) issue area of the case; (3) type
of petitioner (e.g., the United States, an employer, etc.); (4) type of
respondent; (5) ideological direction (liberal or conservative) of the lower
court ruling; and (6) whether the petitioner argued that a law or practice is
unconstitutional.169 Who performed better? The model, as it correctly
predicted 75% of the Court’s affirm/reverse decisions, while the human
experts predicted only 59% correctly.170 During the two decades since this
study, computational tools have improved dramatically,171 and it is shocking
that judges still prize human forecasting over AI forecasting. In 2011, a team
of researchers used the votes of any eight Supreme Court justices from 1953
to 2004 to predict the vote of the ninth justice in those same cases, and their
accuracy was 83%.172 In a 2017 study, a team of researchers used data from
1816 through 2015 to predict 28,000 Supreme Court decisions and 240,000
votes by the justices.173 The algorithm correctly predicted 70% of the
decisions and 72% of the votes.
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Ruger et al., supra note 156.
Id. at 1206–07.
Id. at 1154 n.19.
Id. at 1171.
KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS FOR LAW
PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 107–125, 351–353 (2017).
Roger Guimerà & Marta Sales-Pardo, Justice Blocks and Predictability of U.S. Supreme Court Votes, 6
PLOS ONE e27188, 4 (2011).
Daniel Martin Katz, Michael J. Bommarito II & Josh Blackman, A General Approach for Predicting the
Behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States, 12 PLOS ONE e0174698, 1 (2017).
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III. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL PREDICTION
In Parts I and II of this article, we gained a vantage from which to view
how legal prediction emerges in cases and controversies, and we were able to
gather the results of an empirical study of judicial thinking on legal
prediction. In short, we now have the raw material from which a more
robust understanding of legal prediction can be formed and, more
importantly, from which a new framework of legal prediction can be
constructed. While this discussion is important for legal philosophy, that
strand of thinking is taken up in Part IV, where we also begin to glimpse how
computational advances might alter our philosophical understanding of the
feasibility of Justice Holmes’s prediction model. However, legal philosophy
is not the aim of Part III, nor is it the aim of this new framework. Rather,
the framework enables us, whenever a legal prediction problem or question
is raised, to classify the prediction problem and immediately identify the
issues, benefits, and risks attendant to it. This is important for issues as far
ranging as individualization in sentencing and improper delegation of
judicial authority, to name but two. Moreover, in the specific area of bias in
the law, the failure to properly classify legal prediction problems has led to a
lack of nuance in deciding when legal prediction might be harmful and lead
to entrenched biases, and when it might result in the opposite effect, that is,
decrease bias in legal outcomes. The framework takes steps towards
resolving such error.
Let us return to the hypothetical presented in the introduction to this
article. A startup founder is faced with a regulatory question. In seeking
legal advice, does she want to predict the outcome of subsequent legal review
of her behavior, or does she want something less practical: to know whether
she has, in absolute or theoretical terms, violated applicable law? Whether
there is a difference between these questions was discussed in Parts I and II
of this article, and thus I set it aside here. That said, we can conclude, without
major qualms, that the startup founder cares only about the former: has she
done something that will be deemed illegal or improper by the relevant legal
authority? It is a pure prediction problem, this much is clear. We should not
stop here, however. It is a specific type of prediction problem, the kind found
in only a subset of the canonical cases discussed in Part I. Specifically, it is a
matter of predicting up. What does it mean to predict up? This is the more
typical chain of prediction, indeed, the class of prediction that Justice Holmes
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had in mind when he discussed his prediction model. Lawyers predict lower
court judges, and lower court judges predict higher court judges.
The answer to the question of whether it is an up or down prediction
problem hinges on the identity of the party whose behavior is being
predicted. If that party is a decision maker (i.e., not the object of the
decision), then it is a matter of predicting up. For example, lawyers might
predict judicial behavior. This is a matter of predicting up. But they also
might predict the behavior of jurors, and they might predict the behavior of
prosecutors. These also are instances of predicting up.
In contrast, when the party whose behavior is being predicted is not a
decision maker but rather is the object of the decision being made, then it is
a matter of predicting down. Judges predict what criminal defendants will
do when out on bail, and they predict what offenders will do post-sentencing.
Supreme Court Justices predict how their legal rulings will be implemented
by the impacted parties. These are instances of predicting down.
In recent years, predicting down problems have often been buttressed by
computational predictors. For example, Loomis concerned judicial use of the
COMPAS risk assessment tool.174 As another example, the Arnold
Foundation created the Public Safety Assessment tool (PSA), which is in use
around the country and functions by using nine factors to generate scores
that predict three outcomes in criminal cases—failure to appear, new
criminal arrest while on release, and new violent criminal arrest while on
release.175
With one exception, this reliance on computation is less pronounced in
prediction up problems. Lower court judges, for instance, do not rely on
predictive analytics to gain insight into how the Supreme Court will handle
a specific matter or whether they might get reversed. However, lawyers are

174
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Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8–10, State v. Loomis, Crim. A. No. 2015AP157, 2015 WL
1724741, at 9–11 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2015); see also State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 755–57
(Wis. 2016).
About the Public Safety Assessment, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RSCH. (2020),
https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/factors/ [https://perma.cc/N6MF-KY67] (last visited Jan. 29,
2021).
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increasingly using computational tools to predict the outcomes of motions176
and even cases altogether.177
On this point, it is worth discussing that, as we have seen in Parts I and
II of this article, legal prediction—both up and down—is taking place both
with and without computational aid. Even without the aid of a risk
assessment tool, a judge making a decision regarding pretrial release will
make predictions regarding the defendant’s future conduct. These
predictions might be based on “objective” factors, such as past criminal
convictions, but they also will be based on hunches, on intuition, or likely on
factors not fully conscious to the judge herself. However, were the judge to
use a risk assessment tool like the PSA, the factors going into the prediction
would be explicit.178 Moreover, whether such predictions are generated by
a human expert (a psychologist or psychiatrist, as in Lessard179) or an
algorithm (COMPAS; the PSA), both are using statistics (what, in the case of
the human expert, we would call “experience”) and both are subsequently
used by judges to inform their own predictions. When an expert, in a case
along the lines of Lessard,180 considers the likelihood of a suicide attempt and
states, “Harm is likely,” is this any more transparent or reliable than a datadriven, machine-generated prediction?
While this classification system—predicting, up and down—is a slight
change in our orientation to legal prediction, it is a significant one, as it draws
into relief and clarifies issues over which scholars are currently wrestling. To
start, a number of scholarly books have been written protesting the use of
prediction, and these protestations are largely motivated by claims that such
technology will lead to racially biased outcomes.181 Entire organizations are
devoted to this stance. The AI Now Institute at New York University focuses
on identifying bias in artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on human
176
177
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See BLUE J, https://www.bluejlegal.com/ [https://perma.cc/B8DC-FL2Z] (featuring software that
predicts the outcomes of tax motions) (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
See CLAUDIUS LEGAL INTELLIGENCE, https://www.claudius.ai/ [https://perma.cc/2X6Q7MUX] (featuring an artificial legal intelligence that predicts the outcomes of civil legal matters)
(last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RSCH., supra note 175.
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
Id.
RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY (2019); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING
INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017);
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rights: the Institute has partnered with the American Civil Liberties Union,
publishing papers expressing wariness of the increasing reliance on
technology in the United States.182
Many of the issues that worry commentators are issues inherent to
predicting down. Then-Attorney General Eric Holder famously spoke about
the risk of penalizing individuals for immutable characteristics. Recent
work,183 including the aforementioned books by Ruha Benjamin and
Virginia Eubanks, further this line of thought.184 Michael Donahue’s 2019
article focuses entirely on problems in what I call predicting down.185 These
scholars seem right to question such uses of prediction, but they must be
careful to disambiguate predicting down from predicting up problems.
When it comes to predicting up, there is tremendous potential for
correcting for racial bias through the use of predictive analytics.186 Here, the
prediction model can function like real-time statistics, flagging potential
instances of bias and nudging for preemptive correction of those future
decisions.187 Predicting down, of course, is a different matter, and it should
be understood as such when there are discussions about its propriety. But
predicting up largely permits the benefits of what is called “algorithmic social
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visited Jan. 29, 2021).
See, e.g., Gwen van Eijk, Socioeconomic Marginality in Sentencing: The Built-In Bias in Risk Assessment Tools
and the Reproduction of Social Inequality, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 463, 464 (2017) (analyzing “how
including socioeconomic marginality as a risk factor in sentencing decision reproduces – and
possibl[y] exacerbates – disparities in sentencing as well as social inequality more generally”).
See Benjamin, supra note 181 (discussing how technology, even when it appears neutral, can advance
racial discrimination); Eubanks, supra note 181 (investigating three data algorithms and predictive
models that the government uses to provide public services and how those systems may contribute
to inequality).
See Michael E. Donohue, A Replacement for Justitia’s Scales?: Machine Learning’s Role in Sentencing, 32
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 657, 660–66 (2019) (arguing that such tools lead to a lack of individualization,
are opaque, and encompass only one philosophical conception of punishment).
See Joseph J. Avery & Joel Cooper, Racial Bias in Post-Arrest and Pretrial Decision Making: The Problem
and a Solution, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 257 (2020) (arguing that prosecutors should be given
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increase fairness in decision making during this period).
See id. at 280–93 (proposing that prosecutors should be given race-neutral outcomes to use in their
decision making and that those who deviate from the model’s race-neutral recommendation have
to document the reasons why they have deviated in order to monitor compliance with race-neutral
mandates).
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engineering,” that is, using algorithmic modifications to nudge decisionmakers toward preferred actions.188
Professors Cowgill and Stevenson outline a decisional equation that is
useful for illustrating the difference between predicting up and predicting
down. They posit that a decision maker’s action selection is a maximizing
function of both utility (“the highly subjective preferences about which there
are no correct answers”) and beliefs (p̂: “beliefs about the objective state of
the world that could in principle be verified”).189 An example of p̂ would be
a judge’s belief that a particular defendant will or will not recidivate if
released on bail. This is what I call predicting down.
However, p̂ does not exist in many decisional contexts, especially those
within the criminal justice system. What sentence should a defendant
receive? The answer will hinge on how one conceives of the purpose of
criminal punishment. Is it primarily about rehabilitation? Or is it about
incapacitation? Or perhaps specific deterrence, general deterrence,
retribution, restitution, normative validation—or even something else?
Various of these purposes have been embraced, oftentimes simultaneously,
both historically190 and at present.191 The point is, for decisions such as this,
there is no state of the world that can in principle be verified. There is not
necessarily a right answer.
If a court decides to correct for racial bias in its decisions, it may design
and implement a suggestive model. Let us assume this model is like the one
discussed elsewhere: Black defendants are treated as if they are White
defendants.192 Now p̂, if we still choose to call it that, represents the extent to
188
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See Bo Cowgill & Megan T. Stevenson, Algorithmic Social Engineering, 110 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 96,
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recognition of retributive objectives); Marissa A. Booth, The Road to Recovery: The Third Circuit
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that would eliminate the effects of race when forming predictions).
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which the decision-maker’s action accords with the suggested model’s output.
Are White defendants treated how the machine predicts they should be
treated? Are Black defendants treated how the machine predicts White
defendants so situated should be treated? Importantly, the utility function
would not be independent of this modified p̂; after all, the decision maker is
audited and rated in terms of his or her performance in relation to the
suggestive model’s output. That is, doing what the machine suggests will
result in greater utility for the decision-maker. Considered in this light, we
see that, when predicting up, if a suggestive model is embedded within an
appropriate framework, it will be a powerful force for constraining and
guiding decision making. When the objective of the suggestive model and its
attendant framework is racial equality, greater racial equality should be
observed in actors’ decisions.
With the classification system now clear, we can discuss benefits and risks,
as well as legal issues, that attach to our two classes of prediction problems.193
My aim here is not to exhaustively explore these. Rather, it is to adumbrate
them while, more importantly, showing how different ones attach to the
distinct classes of prediction problems: predicting up is importantly different
from predicting down.
Whose
behavior
is being
predicted?
Decision
•
Makers
(those not
impacted by
the
decision):
prosecutors,
jurors,
judges

193

Classification

Benefits

Risks

Legal Issues

-Predicting Up•

-Bias
•
reduction•
-Efficiency
-Fairness•

-Legal lock-in•
-Undermines
the rule of law•
-Undermines
lay connection•
to legal
processes

-Improper
delegation
-Failure to
adhere to
stare decisis

See Table 1 for an overview.

•
•

April 2022]

Those
•
impacted by
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-Predicting
Down

•
•

-Accuracy•
-Transparency •

-Enshrines •
historical bias
-Error: judges•
predicting
down,
machines
predicting
down, experts
predicting
down

-Lack of
individual
-ization

Table 1. Cursory overview of the two-classification framework for legal
prediction problems.
First, to continue the previous line of thought, when predicting up, there
are a number of benefits that can emerge. One is bias reduction, which has
been discussed in detail elsewhere,194 as well as supra, so I will not belabor the
point here. A second benefit is fairness, which dovetails with bias reduction
but is distinct. Judges are human, and as discussed throughout this article,
their individual personalities transcend the courts on which they sit. Indeed,
the cumulative result is that courts are distinct from each other and circuits
are distinct from each other, and for this reason, forum shopping is a robust
practice.195 Predicting up leads to convergence, as the predictions are
focused on the highest court that is common to the lower courts. Thus,
within the Circuit of Appeals system, so long as the same predictive tool is
used, a plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit could expect the same verdict as a plaintiff
in the Ninth Circuit. While this certainly is a form of fairness, we also can
think of it as a form of efficiency. Dodging certain judges, forum shopping,
crafting arguments specific to the judges one faces—these are lessened in the
face of consistently applied prediction up.

194

195

See, e.g., Joseph Avery & Joel Cooper, Technology in the Legal System: Uses and Abuses, in BIAS IN THE
LAW: A DEFINITIVE LOOK AT RACIAL PREJUDICE IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 161,
161–81 (Joseph Avery & Joel Cooper eds., 2020) (discussing how to reduce the impact of biases by
using data-driven algorithms and legal technology).
See Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco, & John L. Turner, The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary:
Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 413 (2009) (finding evidence
of forum shopping before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created and given
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases initiated in federal district courts).
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These benefits—bias reduction, fairness, efficiency—can be found at the
different levels of predicting up. For example, an attorney in the Midwest
indicated that he was interested in a specific prediction tool196 because he
knew that it could be used to show the insurance companies whether and
when they were treating minority race plaintiffs differently than majority race
plaintiffs. As for efficiency, if prediction is heavily relied upon, then
prosecutors and defense attorneys might agree on what the likely outcome of
a trial will be, thus saving time in case prosecution. Similarly, plaintiffs’ and
defense attorneys might agree on the likely settlement for a personal injury
suit, thus avoiding costly and protracted litigation. But these are best left for
discussion in another article, one focused on the feasibility and result of
instantiating AI and prediction systems.
For the purposes of this article, I will, instead, highlight how the benefits
of predicting down are importantly distinct from the benefits of predicting
up. For one, predicting down is often thrust upon the decision maker, as in
a Miller v. Alabama application,197 so it might not make sense to talk about
benefits outside of a few niche scenarios, such as a lawyer predicting how her
client will perform in a deposition. Or, perhaps, a judge predicting
dangerousness in a bail hearing when such a prediction is not truly
warranted. That said, it does make sense to compare the benefits of machine
vs. human predictions down. To wit, does machine prediction down lead to
a decrease in bias? Most likely not, as a number of scholars have shown that
predicting down suffers from problems stemming from biased datasets,
suspect features (such as criminal arrests, which may themselves be reflective
of bias), and so on.198 Will it lead to fairness? Again, for similar reasons,
probably not, although it could lead to greater consistency (i.e., the results
will be consistently unfair). It may, however, result in greater transparency.
For example, the PSA risk assessment tool uses nine factors, all of which are
clearly explained and outlined.199 When a judge operates in the absence of
196
197

198

199

The tool is Claudius Legal Intelligence, Inc. See supra note 177 (featuring an artificial legal
intelligence that predicts the outcomes of civil legal matters).
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (holding that “mandatory life without parole for
those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”).
See Avery & Cooper, supra note 186, at 283 (describing an approach that would remove “suspect
features” from statistical algorithms to facilitate in moving towards a system of racially equal
treatment for criminal defendants).
See ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RSCH., supra note 175 (showing the Public Safety Assessment
Tool and the nine factors that it uses).
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such a tool, does she use nine clearly explained and outlined factors? Of
course not. She relies instead upon various factors that she may mention and
a host of others that operate semi- or subconsciously. We also have seen, in
Part II, that judges are wary of their ability to predict down, and rightly so.
It is difficult to predict human behavior, and such predictions are always
beset by biases that attach to the predictor.200 Can machines do better?
Perhaps, as reviews are starting to reveal that machines produce less biased
and more accurate predictions than humans.201
Consideration of the risks of predicting up and down reveals the most
evident differences. When predicting up, there is a serious possibility of
technological-legal lock-in.202 As Roscoe Pound wrote in 1907,
The effect of all system is apt to be petrifaction of the subject systematized.
Perfection of scientific system and exposition tends to cut off individual
initiative in the future, to stifle independent consideration of new problems
and of new phases of old problems, and to impose the ideas of one generation
upon another. This is so in all departments of learning.203

Applying this insight to the case of widespread prediction up, the fear is
clear: the system will become fixed, and so fixed will cease to have the
malleable and changeable nature that we expect from our “living” system of
law. Does this risk also attach to machine prediction down? Not really, and
if it does, it is a slightly different risk. There, the risk is that the historical
record, with its biases, will become enshrined through model training, not
that the system itself will become fixed, since there will be new outcomes (did
the defendant actually recidivate on release?) that will update the model
moving forward.
What is a risk of predicting down? One risk is error. Whether the
predictor is legal (a judge), expert (expert witness), or machine (risk
assessment tool), one risk is always error. There is the risk of error in an
individual case that might be an outlier, and there is the risk of consistent
error due to mistreatment of certain demographic groups. Error is not such
200
201

202
203

See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 185–255 (2011) (discussing how predictions
contain various biases, such as hindsight and outcome bias).
See, e.g., Alex P. Miller, Want Less-Biased Decisions? Use Algorithms., HARV. BUS. REV. (July 26, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/07/want-less-biased-decisions-use-algorithms [https://perma.cc/RG33AYMK] (providing examples of research which shows that algorithms are less biased and more
accurate than humans).
See Crootof, supra note 22, at 233, 246–50 (describing how hybrid human-AI judicial systems, once
they are cemented in, may be difficult to change and not easily adaptable to new situations).
Pound, supra note 23, at 606.
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a risk of predicting up. After all, the hierarchical nature of judicial review is
designed to correct for error, including errors in predicting up, as we saw in
the cases presented in Part I.
Even so, we know that predicting up would undermine the lay connection
to legal processes. If such predictions were perfect, what need would there
be for jurors? After all, we would be able to predict outcomes without having
to provide space for lay deliberations. As Lord Herschell said, “important as
it was that people should get justice, it was even more important that they
should be made to feel and see that they were getting it.”204 Or, turning back
to Roscoe Pound, we must acknowledge that the law “must not become so
completely artificial that the public is led to regard it as wholly arbitrary.”205
This risk does not attach to predicting down, nor does the risk of
undermining the rule of law. As Professor Dorf discussed, the prediction
model, to the extent that it emphasizes the importance of the individual
judges who comprise the highest court, undermines the ideal of the impartial
judge, an ideal that is essential to individuals’ faith in the rule of law.206
While there are a host of legal issues that attach to predicting up and
down, I will mention just one for each, as these are the two most prominent—
and they are quite different. For predicting up, the most obvious legal issue
is what some commentators207 call lower court defiance: accurately
predicting up may lead a court, as we saw in Rodriguez, to defy Supreme Court
precedence.208 The Supreme Court has roundly rejected such behavior, and
it typically will deal with it by issuing a summary reversal, as in Shaun Michael

204
205
206
207

208

Lord Herschell, quoted in 2 JAMES BERESFORD ATLAY, THE VICTORIAN CHANCELLORS 460
(1908).
Pound, supra note 23, at 606.
See Dorf, supra note 3, at 684–85 (discussing how the prediction model is inconsistent with central
themes and practices of American law, such as the idea of the impartial adjudicator).
See Malia Reddick and Sara C. Benesh, Norm Violation by the Lower Courts in the Treatment of Supreme
Court Precedent: A Research Framework, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 117, 119 (2000) (explaining that lower court
defiance “refers to the rare event in which the eventually overruled precedent is not cited at all by
the lower court, yet that precedent is overturned as the Supreme Court affirms the lower court”).
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (affirming a Fifth
Circuit decision that renounced Supreme Court precedent, but chastising the Fifth Circuit for
taking this action on its own authority).
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Bosse v. Oklahoma.209 Let us recall Justice Stevens, who decried such an
“indefensible brand of judicial activism.”210
For predicting down, the primary legal issue is quite different: lack of
individualization is the concern, and it is potentially actionable. This was
one of the issues in Loomis, where the claimant argued that the court’s use of
the COMPAS tool violated his right to individualization to the extent that it
relied on group-level statistics.211 Risk assessment always relies on grouplevel statistics, a fact that does threaten individualized treatment, something
that has been guaranteed at least since Furman v. Georgia,212 although the
specifics of the guarantee are nuanced.213 The Loomis court sidestepped the
issue by concluding that, while the tool did not individualize, because it was
not the sole basis for the decision, the sentencing procedure was valid.214 This
is not the final word on this issue, as it will undoubtedly come before courts—
and higher courts—in the future.
IV. HOW THE MACHINE AGE IMPINGES THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
UNDERGIRDING THE PREDICTION MODEL
In Parts I-III of this article, I garnered the raw materials (cases and
controversies; empirical data from sitting judges) needed to understand legal
prediction and generate a new framework for meaningfully engaging with
legal prediction problems. In this final part of the article, I turn to an issue
that is present in all three of the earlier parts and which finds its apotheosis
in a discussion of computational law techniques. The debate between law as
found and law as made mirrors the two dominant techniques for building

209

210
211

212

213
214

137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (“The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals remains bound by Booth’s
prohibition on characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family members about the crime, the
defendant, and the appropriate sentence unless this Court reconsiders that ban.”).
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 757 (Wis. 2016) (noting that the claimant was challenging the
use of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing in part because he argued that “it violates a
defendant’s right to an individualized sentence.”).
408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that “the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight and
Fourteenth Amendments.”).
See William W. Berry III, Individualized Sentencing, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 13, 24–49 (2019)
(discussing the development of the guarantee in criminal cases).
See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 773–74 (Roggensack, C.J., concurring) (noting that it was permissible
to consider the COMPAS tool in sentencing, but a court cannot solely rely on COMPAS to impose
a sentence).

530

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:2

computational legal prediction systems, and understanding of this divide is
helpful for forming a full understanding of the prediction model.
In the nineteenth century, Rudolph Ritter von Jhering, a German jurist
and legal scholar, argued for a shift from Begriffsjurisprudenz (a law of concepts)
to Wirklichkeitsjurisprudenz (a law of outcomes/results).215 In essence, Jhering
was arguing that, instead of philosophically analyzing the field, or human
nature, and forming rules, one should start with what one wishes to see in
practice and build backwards to the rule. Thus, a law of outcomes, a law of
results. If one wants a judge to reach a certain outcome when faced with a
specific type of contention in a divorce case, then one should build a rule
based on that outcome.
To drill deeper into the discussion, when thinking of the concept of
Begriffsjurisprudenz, we might ask, what are the abstract legal problems, and
what are the solutions to those problems? For Roscoe Pound, this would be
the law of rules, the law of concepts, an attempt at building a body of law by
rational inference from first principles.216 Most legal scholars, when
confronted with this idea, immediately think of Langdell: “Law, considered
as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. . . . If these doctrines
could be so classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper
place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their
number.”217 Langdell, of course, represents but one form of this: we also can
think of the German Pandectists who worked on legal science derived from
neo-Kantian first principles of justice.218 The problem with any such
conception of the law is that, when courts deduce from concepts, they do not
always inquire as to what the effect of such deductions will be, nor do they
observe that the outcomes might be the reverse of even the spirit of the
concepts.219 As Pound put it, “[t]he nadir of mechanical jurisprudence is
reached when conceptions are used, not as premises from which to reason,
but as ultimate solutions.”220

215
216
217
218
219
220

See Jhering, supra note 24, at 1–18 (discussing the Law of Purpose as opposed to the Law of
Causality).
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 809 (1989).
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
viii–ix (2d ed. 1879).
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 163, 16667 (M. Howe ed. 1963)
(originally published 1881) (critiquing Kantian principles of justice).
Pound, supra note 23, at 616.
Id. at 620–21.
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Now, considering Wirklichkeitsjurisprudenz, we might ask a very different
question: how can we characterize the efficient use made with the limited
resources that we have? For Pound, this means that, instead of settling on
rules and concepts, we instead ought to deduce decisions.221 As he put it,
instead of seeking rules that will last for years, we should seek the “intelligent
application of the principle to a concrete cause, producing a workable and a
just result.”222 Note that this is not in direct opposition to Begriffsjurisprudenz
(direct opposition would be something more like the original strands of legal
realism, where empiricism was set up to contrast with idealism223), but it is
meaningfully the obverse of Begriffsjurisprudenz in that it is a pragmatic
approach.224 As an example of this approach, Pound cites Justice Marshall’s
work in yielding a living Constitution by judicial interpretation.225 Broad as
this example might be, we have enough of a conception to contour the
debate, and we should see that it mirrors a specific divide in computational
law.
Perhaps the oldest example of an algorithmic legal system (though the
algorithm was “on paper” rather than instantiated in a machine) was the
Valentinian “law of citations” from the fifth century that established a canon
of materials that could be cited—and only these materials were allowed to be
cited.226 When faced with questions of law, judges were tasked with merely
tallying which position had the most support from the precedents.227 Let us
also recall the flourishing of like-spirited movements towards widespread
legal codification during the eighteenth century, as in the Code of Frederick
the Great.228

221
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223
224
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Id. at 613.
Id. at 622.
See Morton J. Horwitz, History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1981–
1982) (discussing the Legal Realism Movement).
Grey, supra note 216, at 819.
Pound, supra note 23, at 615.
Alan Watson, The Law of Citations and Classical Texts in the Post-Classical Period, 34 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 402, 405 (1966).
Pound, supra note 23, at 607.
See, e.g., TIM BLANNING, FREDERICK THE GREAT: KING OF PRUSSIA 465–494 (2016) (discussing
the development of the Code of Frederick the Great, in which at attempt was made to fulfill the
Enlightenment ideal of systematization and codification of both public and private law).
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If we fast forward to recent attempts to automate legal decision making,
we see that the rule-based (or what some call “logic-based”229) approaches
absorb the assumptions of Begriffsjurisprudenz. In the 1980s, a number of
researchers implemented systems based on manually created logical
representations of rules, including Sergot and colleagues’ rule-based
instantiation of the British Nationality Act230 and Peterson and Waterman’s
attempt at rule-based product liability.231 These attempts largely stalled,
however, and serious progress at legal automation and, in turn, legal
prediction did not flourish until rule-based approaches were discarded in
favor of data-driven approaches.232 These data-driven approaches have
been facilitated by advances in computing power and developments of new
computational techniques, such as deep learning.233
In his writing on legal prediction, Justice Holmes distinguished “general”
factors from more specific ones that he deemed too singular or specific to be
informative for prediction.234 He gave the example of “the blandishments of
the emperor’s wife.”235 But Holmes was writing before social science and
computer science had begun to flourish; today, a factor as singular as how
recently a judge has eaten can be used to as a meaningful feature in a
predictive function.236 The result is that computational systems now can
handle manifold information types and predict very well, better than humans
in many instances.237 But should we be alarmed? After all, such prediction
is more closely rooted in Wirklichkeitsjurisprudenz than in the starry ideals of
229
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See Karl Branting, Data-Centric and Logic-Based Models for Automated Legal Problem Solving, 25
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 5 (2017) (discussing logic-based approaches of legal problem
solving).
See Marek Sergot, Fariba Sadri, Robert A. Kowalski, Frank Kriwaczek, Peter Hammond, & H.
Terese Cory, The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program, 29 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 370,
370–72 (1986) (explaining that much of the British Nationality Act of 1981 was translated into
simple logic).
Donald A. Waterman & Mark Peterson, Rule-Based Models of Legal Expertise, ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 272 (1980).
See Branting, supra note 229, at 6 (discussing the recent rise of data-centric approaches).
Ashley, supra note 171, at 107–125 (explaining and illustrating machine learning techniques).
Holmes, supra note 7, at 168–170.
Id.
See Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav, & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions,
108 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 6889, 6892 (2011) (finding that “when judges tend to
make repeated rulings, they show an increased tendency to rule in favor of the status quo,” which
can all be “overcome by taking a break to eat a meal”).
See Ashley, supra note 171, at 107–125, 351–53 (explaining how complex computer case-based
reasoning can help predict new problems).
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Begriffsjurisprudenz. Whether or not we are alarmed, we ought not be
surprised. In 1989, in an article on Justice Holmes’s thought, Professor Grey
wrote, “the primacy of experience over logic, still seems to me the central, if
obscure, truth of American legal thought.”238
In essence, the dilemma is: do we predict as if we are drawing from “a
rigid scheme of deductions from a priori conceptions,”239 or do we rely instead
on a Poundian notion of a law of principles that are closely tied to
outcomes?240 We can come to this question more fully by traveling down a
rather steep yet well-maintained path. David Marr, the British neuroscientist
and physiologist, developed a framework for analyzing complex information
processing systems. In particular, in considering the brain, Marr can be
understood as proposing three levels of analysis.241 These levels are the
computational, algorithmic, and implementational ones.242
Before
explaining the levels, I must note that the “computational” level does not
necessarily refer to computers. Readers should be careful to avoid this
confusion. Computation may refer more broadly to complex mathematical
principles, such as Fluid Dynamics, which I show below.
Let us assume there is a system in place, a system that is engaged in
information processing. At the computational level, we must ask: what task
is the system carrying out? Said slightly differently, when it comes to
computation, we are interested in the goal and its attendant strategies. At
the algorithmic level, we must ask, what method does the system use? In
other words, how should we represent the input and output. Even more,
what is the algorithm that can transform the input into the output? Lastly,
there is the implementational level. Given the hardware at the system’s
disposal, how is the algorithm carried out? Said again, how can we physically
realize the algorithmic process and representation?
From a broader perspective, we can reconceive of these levels as
negotiating between establishing the problem (computational level) to
determining how to solve the problem (algorithmic level) to actualizing the

238
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240
241
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Grey, supra note 216, at 792.
Pound, supra note 23, at 608.
See Id. at 613 (arguing that the American courts should adopt a German code which lays down the
idea of using principles over rules in order “to make rules fit cases instead of making cases fit rules”).
DAVID MARR, VISION (1982) (giving an in-depth investigation into how humans represent and
process information).
John P. Frisby & James V. Stone, Marr: An Appreciation, 41 PERCEPTION 1040 (2012).
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solution (implementational level). These levels can be illustrated by recourse
to an example that Marr provided:
[T]rying to understand perception by studying only neurons is like trying to
understand bird flight by studying only feathers: It just cannot be done. In
order to understand bird flight, we have to understand aerodynamics; only
then do the structure of feathers and the different shapes of birds’ wings make
sense.243

The example Marr is using is that of flight. Feathers, the flapping of
wings: these might seem like computational issues, but they are not. The
computational-level problem is how to fly; the computational problem then
is one of Fluid Dynamics.244 Some birds, some insects, and all working
airplanes are able to solve this computational problem. Their unique
solutions, however, represent different algorithms. Most birds and all planes
take a gliding approach, generating lift through downward movement.
Insects, such as bees, and some birds, such as hummingbirds, generate lift
through both upward and downward wing movement—and lack the ability
to glide.245 These different methods all are representational of the
algorithmic level. They are solutions to the computational problem of how
to fly.
Then what happens at the implementational level? Very simple. The
wings might be made of cartilage and feathers, or wood, or aerospace grade
aluminum.246 These are all different implementations of the algorithmic
solution, each of which works to solve the problem rooted in Fluid Dynamics.
Applying these levels to law helps us to better understand the stakes of the
current push towards computational law and legal prediction. At the
computational level, we obviously must think of the initial computational law
forays into rule-based systems. There, the essence of the values and tensions
are distilled, and the primary task is asking the fundamental questions about
which the law is concerned (indeed, many rule-based efforts stalled because
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Marr, supra note 241, at 27.
See NIGEL DUFFIELD, REFLECTIONS ON PSYCHOLINGUISTIC THEORIES 38 (2018) (explaining that
Marr believes that what distinguishes planes, their pilots, and birds from rocks, platypuses and other
projectiles is that the former are able to satisfy the computational principles, “which include ‘Level
1’ principles of fluid dynamics”).
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
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the fundamental questions were underspecified247). Granted, this is a
centuries long process, one at which legal scholars have been and are
laboring, but if it can be rendered into a computational level, then what is
the value of the algorithmic level? Most importantly, it would help us to
understand systematic deviations from the optimal models. For example,
when asked the question, how long is Mars’s orbit around the sun, people
always give distances that are shorter than the correct answer because they
anchor on earth’s orbit.248 But this error is easy to identify: there is anchoring
(on earth’s orbit) and insufficient adjustment away from the anchor, and this
is the bias. When we are operating at the algorithmic level, we can simply
apply the correct algorithm for correcting for such an error; in this case, it
would be something like Markov Chain Monte Carlo via the MetropolisHastings Algorithm.249 And thus we can quantify the cost of implementing
the algorithm: the longer the adjustment period, the more resources one has
spent and the less time one has to pursue other things in life. So, bias in this
example case is resource-rational.
Knowing that bias might be resource-rational, understanding law and
human decision-making at the algorithmic level helps to inform predictions.
To name just a few ways: anchoring adjustment will be reduced when there
is cognitive load, time pressure;250 it also will be reduced when there is
uncertainty.251 Both of these apply to legal decision-making and especially
to judicial decision-making, and we can see how such an algorithmic
approach could then be used both to predict and to proactively inform
interventions in the direction of desired legal goals (e.g., that similarlysituated defendants be treated similarly). By knowing which algorithms are
247
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See Ashley, supra note 171, at 48–52, 73–106, 171–208 (discussing the process and challenges of
translating statutes into programs, modeling legal reasoning, and representing legal concepts with
different analytical tools).
See Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments
Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 311 (2006) (giving examples of what ‘anchoring’ is).
See Falk Lieder, Thomas L. Griffiths, and Noah D. Goodman, Burn-in, Bias, and the Rationality of
Anchoring, In NIPS 2699–2707 (2012) (explaining that the process to generate a single perfect sample
from a posterior distribution involves the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm).
See Epley and Gilovich at 312, supra note 246 (“[P]eople under cognitive load are less able than
those who are not to modify their initial dispositional inferences in light of subsequently considered
situational constraints.”).
See Karen E. Jacowitz and Daniel Kahneman, Measures of Anchoring in Estimation Tasks, 21
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1161, 1164–65 (1995) (showing that
sometimes responses that are most strongly affected by an anchor are made with relatively low
confidence).
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being used, we can reconstruct the environment so that inputs produce the
outputs that are wanted. As discussed in Part III, predicting up becomes
something quite powerful and desirable.
Thus, we have come full circle. The future of prediction might lie in
thoroughly inhabiting the algorithmic level, but the algorithmic level might
very well include neuro-symbolic AI, where both rule-based and data-driven
processes are deftly combined and permitted to function in tandem. The
result will be both better prediction and better insight into when and why
predictions—and behavior—deviate from what is foreseen, wanted, desired.
Such developments render self-prediction eminently feasible, which should
come as some surprise to those legal scholars who believed that selfprediction was infeasible if not impossible.252 A court of last resort may
sensibly predict how it will rule.
What is truly remarkable is that this computational development, this
manifesting of prediction up and down systems, this machine-future, is in no
way divorced from the fundamental debate with which this article began.
Transcendentalism and functionalism,253 positivism and realism,254 varying
forms of legal realism—all are encapsulated by the ideas that occupy
researchers at the nexus of law, computer science, and prediction.
CONCLUSION
This article made a number of advances in understanding legal
prediction, advances that impinge upon criminal law (risk assessment tools),
civil law and especially torts (judge and jury prediction systems),
administrative law (the role of automated decision tools), and technology law.
There are three advances, in particular, that are worthy of recapitulation in
this conclusion. First, the article provided an intuitive framework for
classifying and handling legal prediction problems. For here on out, a
threshold question is to ask whether one is predicting up or predicting down.
I showed that this classification is useful for thinking through legal prediction
problems. For instance, in the specific area of bias in the law, the failure to
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See Dorf, supra note 3, at 659 (explaining how Hart thought that the prediction model is incoherent
when applied to courts).
See Cohen, supra note 1 (discussing the differences between transcendentalism and functionalism).
See Leiter, supra note 2 (challenging two widespread views about the relationship between Legal
Realism and Legal Positivism).
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properly classify legal prediction problems has led to a lack of nuance in
deciding when legal prediction might be harmful and lead to entrenched
biases, and when it might result in the opposite effect, that is, the lessening of
bias in legal outcomes.
In Part III, I put flesh upon the bones of this new prediction framework,
and I took steps towards clarifying the distinction and why it matters in
practice. This discussion was, of course, a starting point, and I propose that
it prompt research into the contours and implications of pulling apart legal
prediction in the way the framework does. For instance, considering only
predicting up, if it were mechanized and ubiquitous, what legal issues would
be raised? What recourse would claimants and respondents have? In
addition, there should be research into the extent to which specific predicting
up problems require input from predicting down problems. That is, when
modeling how a judge will rule on a particular defendant, that prediction (up)
likely includes predictions about what the judge predicts the defendant will
do (down). Disentangling these is key to unpacking the nuances of the matter.
Second, the article’s empirical findings on judicial thinking regarding
legal prediction are important for academic, theory-driven reasons
(understanding what the law is and what it is that judges believe they are
doing when they are applying the law; unpacking the tension between law as
found and law as made) and also for applied reasons: the research provides
insights into risk assessment tools and the workability of extant legal rules,
such as that promulgated by the Miller v. Alabama Court.255 In particular, I
found that while judges overwhelmingly favored the use of risk assessment
tools, a finding that may be much to the chagrin of legal commentators, they
also admitted that certain prediction tasks, such as predicting future violence
and distinguishing between “state and trait” in minor offenders (i.e., which
offenders are “irreparably corrupt”), are beyond their perceived abilities.
What this means for such standards, that is, what it means for the tasks that
currently befall our judges, is a good question and one worth exploring
further.
Lastly, not only does the article situate legal prediction both in history
(legal philosophy) and in current and future developments (computational
law), but it also fills a scholarly lacuna by providing a canon of legal
prediction cases. In all, the article enables us to see how legal prediction is
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waxing in importance. What was once a largely legal philosophical concern
has become a pressing matter, one the impacts the functioning of the legal
system and will shape its future form.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix contains the survey questions from Part II, presented in
the same order in which they were presented to the participants.
• When deciding a legal matter, I consider what the law requires in an
absolute sense. (Please interpret “in an absolute sense” as indicating
the following: the law transcends the question of how higher court
judges would rule if faced with the matter.)
• When deciding a legal matter, I consider whether my decision would
be reversed by a higher court.
• When deciding a legal matter, I attempt to replicate the result that
would be reached if my state’s highest court were faced with the same
matter.
o Limit analysis to only those attorneys who are state-level
judges.
• When deciding a legal matter, I attempt to replicate the result that
would be reached if the Supreme Court of the United States were
faced with the same matter.
• When a legal matter is being decided, which of the following should
be the focus of the judges making the decision: (1) what result the law
requires, or (2) how higher court judges would rule on the matter?
• If you were attempting to predict the result that would be reached if
the Supreme Court of the United States were faced with a specific
legal matter, as a basis for predicting the ruling, to what extent would
you consider the following:
o published opinions by the justices
o the justices’ non-judicial writings and speeches
o the justices’ general ideological commitments
o your personal knowledge of and casual conversations with
the justices, if any
• I can accurately predict how my judicial peers (specifically, those
judicial peers whom I know well) will rule on specific legal matters.
• I can accurately predict how my state’s highest court will rule on
specific legal matters.
• I can accurately predict how the Supreme Court of the United States
will rule on specific legal matters.
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• The average attorney who knows me well can predict with accuracy
how I will rule on specific legal matters.
• My judicial peers who know me well can predict with accuracy how
I will rule on specific legal matters.
• It is currently possible to build a model (for example, a data-driven
artificial intelligence) that can predict with accuracy how I will rule
on specific legal matters.
• Within the next 10 years, it will be possible to build a model (for
example, a data-driven artificial intelligence) that can predict with
accuracy how I will rule on specific legal matters.
• On the whole, I can accurately predict how criminal defendants will
behave during the post-arrest and pretrial period (i.e., if released on
bail, whether they will commit additional offenses, whether they will
show up for subsequent court dates, etc.).
• When trying to predict how criminal defendants will behave during
the post-arrest and pretrial period (i.e., if released on bail, whether
they will commit additional offenses, whether they will show up for
subsequent court dates, etc.), it is helpful for me to have access to
data-driven predictions, such as risk assessment tools.
• To what extent do you agree with this statement: I can predict
whether a juvenile is “irreparably corrupt”; that is, I can predict
whether a juvenile will be a danger decades from now and after a
long prison sentence.
APPENDIX B
All data, with the exception of demographic information, which have
been withheld in order to protect the privacy of our judicial participants, are
stored on the Open Science Foundation portal at this location:
https://osf.io/7tbx3/

